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ABSTRACT 
Valuing Electricity Assets in Deregulated Markets:
 
A Real Options Model with Mean Reversion and Jumps
 
Valuation of electricity generating assets is of central importance as utilities are forced to 
spin-off generators with the introduction of competitive markets. A continuous-time 
mean reverting price path with stochastic upward jumps is proposed as an appropriate 
model for long-run competitive electricity prices faced by a generator. A real options 
model is derived via dynamic programming using infinite series solutions. The derived 
model produces asset values which are uniformly higher than those produced by existing 
models, and which accurately predict observed generator sale prices. The model has 
favorable implications for stranded cost recovery and generator entry in competitive 
markets. 
Keywords: real options, electricity deregulation, mean reversion, jump processes, asset 
valuation. 
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I. Introduction and Overview 
The recent sale of the Homer City electricity generating plant by New York State Electric 
and Gas (NYSEG) and GPU, Inc. to Edison Mission Energy surprised many industry 
observers with its high sale price of $1.8 billion. For example, the $955/KW sale price of 
Homer City (a 1884 MW coal plant on the New York-Pennsylvania border) is nearly 
triple that of the (older and less well-located) Dunkirk and Huntley plants recently sold 
by Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (NMPC) in upstate New York. At fIrst glance, 
the Homer City sale might seem to be an example of the Winner's Curse (e.g. Kagel and 
Levin 1986), with Edison Mission the unlucky winner. This paper argues that if the 
proposed electricity-specific real options model is appropriate, the price paid by Edison 
Mission is reasonable. The proposed model takes into account the unusual character of 
electricity supply and transport in selecting a price path. The electricity-specific model 
produces higher asset values than do traditional real options models. An implication is 
that many plants sold to date which seem appropriately valued by traditional models 
could well have been undervalued because traditional models fail to capture the true, 
favorable nature of competitive electricity prices. Under-valuation, while a boon to 
buyers, would negatively impact existing utilities, their shareholders and ratepayers. 
The sale of the Homer City plant was prompted by the deregulation of the electricity 
industry in both New York and Pennsylvania. I As competition is introduced, existing 
regulated utilities are being forced to spin off their generating assets in competitive 
auctions to prevent combined generating and transmission corporations from exercising 
the potential market power which would come with the ability to shut out competitors via 
the transmission network. The spread of competition means that well over $300 billion in 
utility generating assets could ultimately be sold at auction.2 
What is the value of a generating unit which is able to compete in deregulated electricity 
markets? An appropriate tool for asset valuation in a world of uncertain prices is a real 
options model (Dixit and Pyndick 1994, Trigeorgis 1996). Such models generally 
produce higher asset values than traditional discounted cash flow techniques. Given that 
the detailed asset valuation models currently used by the industry can easily cost 
hundreds of thousands of dollars to implement, a sparsely parameterized real options 
model is a useful tool. A prerequisite for valuing a generating asset with a real options 
model is a stochastic price path appropriate for electricity prices in a wholesale market.3 
A continuous-time mean reverting process with stochastic upward jumps is presented as 
an appropriate model of prices faced by generators in competitive wholesale electricity 
markets. Such a process has not be employed in the real options literature, and comes at a 
time when alternatives to the standard assumption of geometric Brownian motion (GBM) 
have drawn increased interest. Lund (1993), for example, argues that GBM is an 
inappropriate price path characterization for exhaustible resources. Mean reverting price 
paths have been suggested as more appropriate for commodities such as oil and copper 
(Pindyck and Rubenfeld 1991, Schwartz 1997, and Baker, Mayfield and Parsons 1998). 
The price path used here encompasses both GBM and mean reversion as special cases, 
while allowing random, and temporary, upward jumps in prices. The special 
characteristics of electricity production, transmission and demand suggest a price path 
which has these characteristics, and that is generally distinct from that of other 
commodities. As shown by Schwartz (1997), price path specification significantly 
influences resulting asset values. 
A quasi-analytic real options asset valuation model is derived via dynamic programming 
using the proposed mean reverting price process with jumps. The mean reverting with 
jumps price path has not previously been examined in a real options framework. The 
solution requires solving a non-homogeneous functional differential equation with the use 
of linearly independent infinite series, with the model easily implemented in a 
spreadsheet. The model developed here adds to the limited portfolio of analytic real 
options models and demonstrates a flexible solution technique using infinite series which 
might be used to develop future models. The calculated asset values are much higher 
-
...under the mean reverting with jumps specification when compared with the nested 
models of GBM and simple mean reversion. One interesting result is that while at low 
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prices increased volatility in electricity prices increases asset values, at high prices 
increased volatility lowers asset values. This is in contrast to GBM based models, where 
increased volatility generally increases values. Using plausible price parameter values 
and using the Homer City plant physical characteristics, the derived model produces asset 
values close to the observed sale price for Homer City. The derived model implies higher 
than anticipated levels of electricity industry investment, increased stranded cost recovery 
and delayed nuclear plant retirement when compared with conventional models. 
While much work has been done on real options generally (e.g. Dixit and Pindyck 1994, 
Trigeorgis 1995, 1996), little has been done in the electricity sector. Pindyck (1993) 
explored investment in nuclear power plants with cost uncertainty. However, until 
recently revenue uncertainty has not been an important issue in utility investment 
planning. Generally the electricity-specific option models developed for competitive 
markets have been focused on financial options or sholt-run Monte Carlo models (Deng, 
Johnson and Sogomonian 1998, Deng 1998, Tseng and Barz 1998), though each has 
recognized the unique character of electricity price paths. 
The next section provides the stochastic price path and detailed justification, as well as 
model set up and assumptions. Section III presents the model derivation, numerical 
evaluation of the model, and a comparison of asset values under alternative stochastic 
processes with calculations specific to the Homer City plant. Section IV presents 
conclusions. 
ll. The Model 
It is assumed that the price for a unit of electricity sold by a generator evolves according 
to a mean-reverting process with jumps. The stochastic process differential is given by: 
dP = ry(P - P)Pdt + aPdz + Pdq (1) ­
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where dt is a small increment of time, dz is an increment of a standard Wiener process 
and: 
owI prob. (1- A)dt
dq= {u wI prob. Adt u > ° 
P is the average yearly on-peak price of electricity in S/KWh, P is the reverted-to 
electricity price, II is the rate of reversion, u is the jump size (scaled by P), Ais the jump 
frequency, and 0' is the standard deviation (scaled by P). If A=O, the price process 
becomes simple mean reversion. If ll=O as well, then the model becomes GBM without 
drift. Thus the model is a general price process which will allow flexible 
parameterization. Note that in this formulation the actual rate of mean reversion is high 
when P is high and low when P is low. This might imply, for example, relatively rapid 
industry entry when high prices are observed, but relatively slow exit. 
Choosing the Price Path 
This price path combines elements of a simple form of jump diffusion with geometric 
mean reversion, each of which has been explored separately (Dixit and Pindyck 1994, 
Schwartz 1997, Saphores and Carr 1998). Why is this an appropriate price path 
specification for electricity? The mean reverting component is consistent with other 
commodity price paths. Pindyck and Rubenfeld (1991), Schwartz (1997), and Baker, 
Mayfield and Parsons (1998), among others, note that the real prices of commodities such 
as oil and copper are mean reverting in the long run.4 Strong mean reversion is also 
widely assumed for short and medium tenn (daily and monthly) prices in competitive 
electricity markets (see Pilipovic 1997, Barz and Johnson 1998, or Deng, Johnson and 
Sogomonian 1998). This is because the entry of new generating capacity, through either 
greenfield installations, increased capacity from existing generators, or increased sales 
• 
from adjacent grid areas, suggests the persistence of competitive markets. The history of 
~. 
electricity production under regulation suggests stable electricity prices, not the 
unbounded growth provided by GBM. The mix of available fuelS (coal, oil, gas, solar, 
4 
wind, etc.) and an existing generator stock which utilizes this range of options allows 
primary fuel substitution, thus insulating electricity prices from the long term vagaries of 
commodity markets and oligopolistic behavior in those markets (e.g. OPEC in oil 
markets in the 1970's). 
But there are complications caused by the transmission grid, especially when node 
specific on-peak, not just average regional, prices are considered.5 Electricity markets 
facilitate exercise of market power in general (see, for example, Rudkevich, Duckworth, 
and Rosen 1998), and create isolated regions where market power might exist in an 
otherwise competitive system. It is important to note that each generator is likely to face a 
node-specific locational price. Nodal prices are much more volatile than system average 
prices and allow a generator to have market power which significantly influences its own 
price but not that of competitors.6 The PJM region, for example, uses locational spot 
prices which have large variability both spatially and through time (Hogan 1998). 
California uses zonal average prices which allow regional variation. 
Price jumps are enabled by two other characteristics of electricity markets. First is that 
electricity storage is generally infeasible, thus there is little or no ability to arbitrage 
across time. This reduces the ability of markets to dampen price shocks. Second, inelastic 
demand means that there is little consumption reduction in response to a rise in prices. 
The yearly price elasticity of electricity demand in New York State, for example, has 
been estimated at -0.042 for the residential sector to -0.261 for the industrial sector 
(Ethier and Mount 1998). 
Upward, localized (either nodal or zonal) jumps in electricity prices could happen for a 
number of reasons. Plant shutdowns, like the Millstone nuclear plant shutdowns in New 
England in the summer of 1997, would temporarily raise electricity prices for an entire 
region. 7 Locational prices faced by individual generators would fluctuate more 
dramatically. Line constraints or outages also create load pockets, allowing generators ­
inside the pocket to exploit market power. Bernard et al (1998) show that dramatic price 
differentials can occur between a load pocket and the remainder of a region. There is 
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strong evidence of market power within a load pocket being exploited in the England and 
Wales market by an individual generator when line constraints are present (Newbery 
1995, p.58). In this case, offer prices, and subsequent payments, increased by a factor of 
nearly five and persisted before being addressed by regulators. Changing demand patterns 
or new load can also create load pockets. Oligopolistic behavior may also develop, 
evidenced through capacity withholding or inflated offer prices. Evidence of oligopolistic 
behavior in the England and Wales electricity market suggests that this might happen in a 
systematic fashion before it is recognized and reigned in by regulators (see Wolak and 
Patrick 1997). This too would lead to a significant price rise. 
The stylized facts above suggest that while long-run electricity prices might be mean 
reverting, generators are likely to also experience localized (or even plant specific) 
upward jumps which allow temporarily increased profits. Capturing this in the stochastic 
price path will prove to have a large effecl on assel values. 
Modeling Generating Assets 
A generating plant has operating costs of C ($/Kwh) per unit of output. The yearly profit 
function for the plant can then be written: 
II(P) = (P-C) M (2) 
where M is total on-peak electricity production per year. P and C must be the average 
yearly on-peak price and cost of electricity to the generator, including amortized capital 
costs for repair and refurbishment in $/Kwh. Thus M is on-peak Kwh per year. The 
implicit assumption is that off-peak hours are 'break even' hours for the plant, which 
given the low and stable off-peak prices observed in off-peak electricity markets, is not 
particularly restrictive. Clearly this ignores complexities involved in electricity 
production, such as generator ramping constraints (the speed at which a generator is 
-

physically able to increase or decrease production) and start-up costs. 
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Note that increased detail might be incorporated in the model by breaking up a year into 
smaller time blocks (e.g. quarters), with operation each quarter viewed as functionally 
independent of other quarters. Thus there would be a separate price parameterization for 
each quarter, with M (and C) adjusted accordingly. This would allow a richer variety of 
price processes, some without jumps (for fall and spring, perhaps), and others with jumps 
(summer and winter). It would also allow patterns in seasonal generation, input prices, or 
outages. The value of the plant would then be the sum of the value in each quarter.8 For 
simplicity the model presented uses a yearly value. 
To calculate plant value by dynamic programming, the value function for an operating 
generator V(P) must satisfy the Bellman equation: 
OV(P)=TI(P)+ ~tE,{dV} (3) 
with discount rate D, so the yearly return to the plant's value equals the yearly profit plus 
the expected capital gain. Note that this assumes an infinitely lived plant. While that is 
not strictly true, if the plant can be expected to last many years, modeling a finitely-lived 
plant as infinitely lived is a reasonable approach. Dixit and Pindyck (1994) finds the 
difference to be negligible for a life span greater than ten years (pAOI). The fmitely lived 
plant problem involves a functional partial differential equation which requires numerical 
solution. The focus here is on obtaining an analytic formula. 
To solve the Bellman equation (3), dV can be expanded as: 
Substituting for dP from above, and applying Ito's Lemma, results in: 
-
... 
[av at - avap 2 I 2 2 aap
2V] 
2 
av
ap 
av
ap . dV = -+71(P-P)P-+-CT P - dt+CTP-dz+P-dq 
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Taking the expectation operator, where ~ equals zero and E{dz}=O leads to: 
- av I 2 a2V]E{dV} = ry(P - P)P-+ -cr p - dt+ Edq {A[V(P+UP,t) - V(P,t)]}dt2[ ap 2 2 ap 
Substituting back into the Bellman equation and using V and V' to denote the fIrst and 
second derivatives of V(P) yields: 
8\!(P) =D(P) + ry(P - P)PV'(P) + .!..cr2p 2V"(P) + A[V(P+ uP) - V(P)]
2 
Rearranging and combining terms gives: 
.!..cr 2 p 2V"(P) + ry(P - P)PV' (P) - (8 + A)V(P) + AV((l +u)P) =-D(P) (4)
2 
which is a non-homogeneous functional differential equation to be solved for V(P).9 
The General Solution. 
Standard practice is to solve the homogeneous equation first to fInd the 'general' solution 
to the equation. 10 The homogeneous equation corresponding to (4) is: 
.!.cr2p 2V"(P) + ry(P - P)PV'(P) - (8 + A)V(P) + AV((l +u)P) =0
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A solution to the homogeneous equation is given by the infinite series representation: 
­
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V(P) = Ianpn+r 
n=O 
-V'(P) =Ian (n + r)pn+r-l 
n=O 
-V"(P) =Ian (n + r)(n + r _l)pn+r-2 
n=O 
Substituting V(P) into the homogeneous equation, combining powers of p, reindexing 
and rearranging results in: 
[~ (j2aor(r -1) + rryPao - (A. + 8)ao+Mo(l +u)']r 
~[(.!..(j2an (n + r)(n + r -1) + ryPan(n + r) - (A. + 8)an+Mn(l + ur+r l~ +r 
+£.J 2 )r =0 
n-l 
- -ryan_len + r -1) 
For the above equation to hold for all P>O requires: 
1 2 ­
-(1 r(r-l)+rT]P -(A,+8)+A,(l+u)' =0 
2 
for ao not equal to zero. This equation can be solved numerically for r. It can be shown 
that r is strictly increasing for r greater than (less than) the positive (negative) solution to 
the implicit equation for r and that two roots result. The following equation must hold for 
every n>O: 
Solving recursively for an as a function of ao leads to: 
­
~. 
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Because ao appears in every term, it can be moved outside the summation. The factorial 
operator indexes every n inside the brackets and excludes n=O. It is shown in the 
Appendix using the ratio test that the terms of V(P) converge to zero as n becomes large 
for all u > -2. The restriction on u is not a problem for this model, as we anticipate only 
positive (u>O) jumps. The general solution is of the form: 
V(P)=cI VI(P) + C2 Vz(P). 
where the subscripts denote solutions associated with rI and r2, and CI and C2 are free 
coefficients, which can incorporate ao. Thus substituting the definition of an into V(P) 
leads to: 
(5) 
A Particular Solution. 
The particular solution to the non-homogeneous equation is an infinite series of the form: 
-
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"" 
V(P) = Lanpn 
n=O 
"" IV'(P) = Lannpn­
n=1
 
""
 
v "(P) = L ann(n _1)pn-2 
n=2 
which is linearly independent of the general solutions to the homogeneous equation. 
Substituting into the non-homogeneous equation, combining powers of P, reindexing and 
rearranging as before results in: 
-(A+8)ao+Nlo-CM + [TJPa l -(A+8)a j +Nl1(l+u)+M]P 
+i [~(12 ann(n -1) +TJPann -TJan-1(n -1) - (8 +A)an+ Aan(l +ur ]p lI 
n=2 2 
=0 
For the above equation to equal zero, each coefficient for each power of P must equal 
zero. For the first term (coefficient of f'J=1) solving for ao gives: 
-CM 
ao = 8 
The second term (coefficient of P) solved for aj gives: 
M 
at = -------==--­
8 -TJP -AU 
And the third, and recursive, term (coefficient of P") rearranged and solved for an as a 
function of aj gives: 
-
..-. 
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a" =[I
"2CT2n(n-I)+7JPn-(o+A)+A(l+u)" ]! 
So the complete expression for \I(P) is: 
For \I(P) , the expected present value of the future proiits from the generating plant, to 
be positive and increasing for P>O and thus to make economic sense, the following 
regularity conditions must hold: 
(7)
 
and 
for n> 1 which ensures that the infinite series terms are greater than zero. If they are not 
greater than zero, then for some (large) values of P the entire term may become negative. 
Discussion ofRegularity Conditions 
The regularity conditions (7) and (8) ensure that \I(P) is positive and increasing for all 
values of P. Clearly this is desirable from an economic point of view; it is difficult to 
think of conditions under which one would expect the present value of the plant to 
decrease for an increase in P. The first condition (7) is similar to the condition for GBM, 
-
(8)
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o>a, where the interest rate is greater than the underlying growth rate of the price of the 
asset. Otherwise, investing in the asset is a risk-free 'money machine' where money can 
be borrowed at 0, invested at a, and produce unlimited profits. In this case, 0 must be 
greater than an 'expected growth rate' each period, which is the movement 11 P toward 
the mean price level plus the expected rise due to a jump AU. If this constraint is violated, 
the expected growth in price each period is greater than the growth in asset value which 
would occur at the discount rate, again creating a 'money machine'. 
The need for the second regularity condition is more complicated. If the first condition 
holds, V (P) may well be positive, especially for small values of P. However, as P rises 
the infinite series terms for 11> 1, which are made negative by the violation of the second 
condition, take on increased weight. This can cause V (P) to be downward sloping in P 
or even cause the value to turn negative. This violates economic logic. Looking at the 
second condition (8) for n=2 gives: 
The left hand side is a modified variance term, with the model variance adjusted by the 
mean reverting term and jump terms. The second regularity condition is violated when 
the modified variance is too small. Thus to move away from violating the second 
regularity condition, we must increase the variance in price by increasing A, u, or cr, or 
increase the expected movement in price toward the mean level by raising 11 P . This is 
nearly the converse of the interpretation of the first condition, which is violated when 
there is too much price movement. An interpretation of the second regularity condition is 
that if these parameters are not sufficiently large, then the model is inappropriate. That 
the model is potentially unstable for small values of A, u, and 11 P is not likely to be a 
problem in real world use. This is because for any price path which generated small 
-
values for these parameters, it would likely be difficult to distinguish from GBM using 
econometric techniques. 
13 
Combining the General and Particular Solutions 
So the complete solution to the non-homogeneous functional differential equation is the 
sum of the general and particular solutions: 
as defmed above in (5) and (6). So the full equation for V(P) is: 
-
Note that if there is neither mean reversion nor jumps (ll=O, A=O, u=O) the model 
becomes: 
which is the same as the GBM model provided by Dixit and Pindyck (1994, p.18?) if 
price and cost are both discounted at the same rate. 
If the generator can be costlessly shut down when P falls below C, the value function can 
be separated into two parts, one of which solves the homogeneous equation and the other 
of which solves the non-homogeneous equation. Following the logic of Dixit and 
14 
Pyndick (1994), we would expect the value of the option to generate to go to zero as P 
goes to zero, and for the value of the option to shut down to go to zero as P becomes very 
large. Defming the roots of our implicit equation for r as rj>O and r2<0, we can break up 
the value function for different values of P: 
This is the value of the generator as a function of P with costless shutdown and restart. 
To determine Cj and b2 we use the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions where 
p=c. The interpretation is that the value of the option to generate must equal the value of 
the option to shut down plus the value of output when P=C, and that the rate of change of 
these conditions (high order contact conditions) also be equal. These conditions are: 
Cl~(C) = b2V2(C) +V (C) 
Cl~'(C) =bY2'(C)+ V'(C) 
(10) 
(11) 
The parameters Cj and b2 must be solved for numerically. Once they are determined, the 
value of the generator V(P) can be found. 
Evaluating the Model: Changing Volatility, Rate ofMean Reversion and Jump Size 
Consider the following numerical examples with base parameter values summarized in 
Table 1. The calculated parameter values for the model are provided in Table 2. For 
model evaluation jump size u was varied from 0.4 to 1. As expected, increasing the size 
of jumps generally increased the value of a generating asset. This is shown in Figure 1. 
One interesting result of the model is that for a low jump size value (0.4), higher price 
levels produced asset values which rose above those produced by jump sizes of 0.6 and 
0.8. Note that at this value, the second regularity constraint is close to being violated. 
Thus for this parameterization, the model is unstable for small jump sizes. 
-
~. 
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The effect of varying the rate of mean reversion Tl from 0 to 0.4 is shown in Figure 2. If 
the rate of mean reversion is zero, the model collapses to geometric Brownian motion 
with jumps. As expected, asset value increased with increasing rates of mean reversion. 
What was surprising was that the rate of mean reversion had such a significant effect on 
asset value. Doubling the rate of mean reversion (from 0.2 to 0.4, for example) 
approximately doubles asset value. This suggests that accurate determination of both 
whether a price process is mean reverting and the rate of mean reversion is important for 
asset valuation. 
The standard deviation was varied from 0.05 to 0.4, with the effects shown in Figure 3. 
The results were interesting in that at low prices, a high standard deviation produced 
higher asset values, but at high prices, lower standard deviation produced higher values. 
One interpretation is that at low price levels, a high standard deviation is more likely to 
get you "back in the money", while at high price levels, is more likely to take you out of 
the money. However, the standard deviation of the stochastic process had a small effect 
on asset values relative to the other parameters. The relative insensitivity of V(P) to the 
size of the standard deviation is potentially useful. It suggests that parameterizing the 
model with a high standard deviation will not strongly affect asset values, but can help in 
satisfying the regularity conditions. 
III. Application to the Homer City Plant 
The Homer City plant sale price is widely viewed by industry analysts, utility executives 
and regulators as being well above expectations. For example, while Homer City sold for 
approximately $955/KW of capacity, NMPC recently sold its Huntley and Dunkirk coal 
plants for $281/KW (net of two Huntley units slated for retirement). In part this is 
because Homer City is an especially desirable plant. It is a relatively new (the newest unit 
came on line in 1977) and efficient baseload coal plant near large coal supplies, with 
direct connections to two different regional electricity markets (Pennsylvania-New 
­
Jersey-Maryland and western New York). Is the Homer City value reasonable, or is it 
dramatically overvalued? Using the real options model developed in the previous section, 
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with realistic parameter values, the Homer City price is close to the calculated plant value 
while the NMPC units appear undervalued. The model was parameterized for the Homer 
City plant as in Table 3. 
The reverted-to price level is $0.034/KWh, which is the average on-peak summer price 
level in PJM East from 1996 to 1998. The cost of production of $0.038/KWh (double 
reported variable production costs in 1996, from Load and Capacity Data 1997) is 
assumed to include all fixed and variable costs not covered during off-peak hours. This 
would include amortized capital costs for repair and refurbishment. The plant is assumed 
to simply cover variable costs dUling the remainder of the week on average. The output 
per year in Kwh assumes a 90% capacity factor for on-peak hours for the plant's 1884 
Mw. The model is well behaved with these parameter values, with both regularity 
conditions satisfied. Remember that since we are using a model of an infinitely lived 
plant, the calculated plant value is higher than what would be calculated for a finitely 
lived plant. 
One interesting exercise is comparing asset values under different price path assumptions, 
i.e. mean reverting with jumps vs. mean reversion vs. GBM. Since the mean reverting 
with jumps model contains mean reversion and GBM as special cases, this is a 
straightforward process. To achieve mean reversion, ').. was set to zero. To achieve GBM, 
T\ was also set to zero. Figure 4 shows the value of the generating plant for a range of 
prices for each price path. Adding simple mean reversion to GBM (with the current 
parameterization) increases the calculated Homer City plant value from $931 million to 
$1.279 billion when evaluated at P. Using mean reversion with jumps increases plant 
value to $1.836 billion. GBM produces the lowest values over the range of P, while mean 
­
reversion with jumps produces the highest. 
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Do these values make sense? It does make sense that mean reversion increases plant 
values, as the risk of low prices is lowered. Dixit and Pindyck (1994, p. 405) note that 
inclusion of mean reversion can easily affect asset values by 40%. That is consistent with 
these results. Adding jumps should also be expected to increase asset value, given that the 
jumps are only expected to be positive. Since in this case the jumps are to nearly double 
the current price level (1.75 times the current price level), large changes in asset value 
result. One mild surprise is that mean reversion always produces higher values than does 
GBM (with zero drift). This is surprising because one might expect that for high values of 
P and low values of P that GBM would produce higher values. This might be expected 
to occur because you expect that a mean reverting price process will revert toward the 
low P, but that GBM will not necessarily produce lower prices. 
Clearly model specification significantly affects plant value, with the differential 
increasing in electricity price, and the mean reverting with jumps plant value very close 
to the $1.8 billion purchase price of the plant. Remembering that the model overvalues 
assets by assuming an infinite life, this suggests that the actual sale price was high but not 
dramatically so. While other parameterizations would have generated different values, the 
current parameterization is a reasonable one, and produces a reasonable value. As 
important is that other price paths produce dramatically different asset values for 
common parameter sets, and these values are significantly lower than the observed sale 
price of Homer City. 
For comparison Table 4 provides parameters for a joint model of the Dunkirk and 
Huntley plants, with the same mean reverting characteristics as for Homer City but with 
less frequent and smaller jumps because of Dunkirk and Huntley's location in western 
-

New York, not at the intersection of two regions. The cost of generation is raised by 50% 
over the Homer City plant to reflect the relative inefficiency of these plants, and the on­
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peak capacity factor is dropped to 40%. Capacity is adjusted appropriately. Note that the 
mean price level is raised to $0.04/KWh while the expected number of jumps and jump 
size fall. The mean price level rises to reflect the reduced capacity factor, so while the 
plant is running less, the average price faced by the plant will be higher. The jumps 
decrease in frequency and size to reflect the less favorable location of the plant in western 
New York rather than between two regions, which might each experience price jumps. 
The resulting asset value of $450.8 million using the mean reverting with jumps model is 
well over the purchase price of $332 million (adjusted for retiring units). This result must 
be qualified by noting that with these plants, the buyer assumed a transition power 
contract with NMPC under which it is to sell electricity at guaranteed prices over the first 
four years of ownership, and that the model assumes an infinitely lived plant. Thus the 
plants will not face the (desirable) market price process in the ShOlt term, which might 
depress realized plant values. Still, the Dunkirk and Huntley plants would appear under­
priced at $332 million if the mean reverting with jumps model is appropriate. 
IV. Conclusions 
This paper has presented the derivation of a quasi-analytic solution to a real options 
model which is unique in the literature. The mean reverting with jumps specification is a 
flexible form which is potentially appropriate for a wide range of commodities and 
provides dramatically different valuation results when compared with standard models. 
The model is flexible enough to allow downward price jumps (-2<u<0), and the lack of 
restrictions on M allow a wide range of normalizations for P and C. 
The results presented here suggest that the mean reverting with jumps real option model ­
is a useful tool for electricity asset valuation, providing reasonable asset values for the 
given parameters. The model is relatively simple to parameterize and use despite the need 
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for some numerical solutions. It is an inexpensive supplement to more detailed and time­
consuming asset valuation methods, and incorporates the important notion of option 
value. Sensitivity testing of model parameters is straightforward. Unfortunately, while 
asset sales are occurring now, useful price data which would allow econometric 
parameter estimation are years away_ But the price path is grounded in the realities of 
electricity markets and price histories of other commodities. Incorporating these realities 
is demonstrated to strongly influence calculated asset values. Once a number of asset 
sales have taken place in a region, it will be possible to calculate implied price parameters 
in a consistent and flexible framework. 
The sale of electricity generating assets will have important effects on existing utilities 
and ratepayers. If the model developed here is appropriate, utilities should receive much 
more for generating assets than would be expected under traditional model assumptions. 
This will help to mitigate stranded costs and ultimately benefit ratepayers. The model 
also has implications for nuclear plants considering early retirement (e.g. Maine Yankee 
and Yankee Rowe in New England). If the real electricity price process is as favorable to 
investment as the mean reverting with jumps model suggests, early retirement should 
become less likely. High asset values will also induce higher than anticipated levels of 
capital investment in the electricity sector. This has favorable implications for electricity 
consumers in the form of highly competitive electricity markets and larger numbers of 
new, efficient plants. 
-
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APPENDIX
 
- n rLemma: V (P) = Lan p + , with an as defined in the text for the general solution, 
n=O 
converges for all rand u>-2. 
pn+r+l 
Proof: Using the ratio test, if an+ 1 :s; cas n ~ 00 , where c is a constant such that 
Pn+r an 
O<c<1, then V(P) converges. Using the definition of all above: 
Pn+r+l a _n+1 
Pn+r an 
r+-"r(" (r + n) lao[ ±", (n + r -1) + ryp n + r) - (). + 8) + ).(1 + ur+'} 
pWry" (r + n -l)!ao[( ~ ,,' (n + r) + ryp }n + r + I) - (). + 8) +).(1 + ur+'''} 
Simplifying: 
P n+r+l an+1 
Pn+r an 
pn+r+1 
n 1Clearly there exists an n* large enough such that for all n>n*, a + pn+r :s; c , where c is 
an 
-

a constant such that O<c< 1. Thus V (P) = Lan pn+r converges. 'v' 
n=O 
-
Lemma: V (P) =Lan pn , with an as defined in the text for the particular solution, 
n=O 
-

converges for u>-2. 
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p n+1 
Proof: Using the ratio test, if an +1 S cas n ~ 00, where c is a constant such that 
anpn 
O<c<l, then V (P) converges. Using the definition of an above: 
a"+.P"+' ; P"+>1)"+'(n)!a.[( ~"'(n -1)+1)P In) -(A+5) + A(I + u)" } 
a"P" P"1)" (n -I)!a.[( ~ ,,' (n) + 1)P In + I) - (A + 5) + A(I + u)"+'} 
Simplifying: 
a 
n
+1pn+l PTJI1 
=-:-----------'--------------=
 
a"P" [( ~", (n)+1)P In+ I) - (A+5) +A(I + u)"+>]
 
pn+l 
Clearly there exists an n* large enough such that for all 11>11*, an +1 " S c, where c is a 
a"P 
-
constant such that O<c<l. Thus V(P) = La"P" converges.V 
n=O 
-
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Table I. Parameter Values Used for Comparisons 
Variable 
prO) 
P 
11 
u 
(J 
A 
o 
C 
M 
Definition
 
Initial Price in $/Kwh
 
Mean Price of Electricity in
 
$/Kwh
 
Rate of mean reversion
 
Size of random jump
 
Std. Deviation of electricity
 
prices (yearly)
 
Frequency of jumps
 
Interest rate
 
Cost of production
 
Output per year in Kwh
 
Value 
$0.021 
$0.025 
0.2 
0.8 
0.1 
0.05
 
0.06
 
$0.021
 
350,000,000
 
-

..­
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Table 2. Calculated Parameter Values 
Parameter Value 
rl 1.221847296 
r2 -4.61931422 
b2 0.088818206 
cl 43,171,481,446 
• 
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Table 3. Homer City Parameter Values 
Variable 
prO) 
P 
11 
u 
0' 
A. 
o 
C 
M 
Definition
 
Initial Price in $/Kwh
 
Mean Price of Electricity in
 
$/Kwh
 
Rate of mean reversion
 
Size of random jump
 
Std. Deviation of electricity
 
prices (yearly)
 
Frequency of jumps
 
Interest rate
 
Cost of production
 
Output per year in Kwh
 
Value 
$0.034 
$0.034 
0.10 
0.75 
0.35 
0.025 
0.09 
$0.038 
7,073,074,286 
-

... 
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Table 4. Dunkirk and Huntley Parameter Values 
Variable Definition Value 
pro) Initial Price in $/Kwh $0.040 
Mean Price of Electricity in $0.040P 
$/Kwh 
Rate of mean reversion 0.1011 
u Size of random jump 0.5 
0' Std. Deviation of electricity 0.35 
prices (yearly) 
A
 
8
 
Frequency of jumps 0.02 
Interest rate 0.09 
C
 Cost of production $0.057 
M Output per year in Kwh 1,968,914,286 
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l In the United States, individual states have the power to deregulate at their own pace, and most are 
moving in that direction. California, for example, has a competitive wholesale market already in existence, 
with plans for retail competition. The Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland region has had a functioning 
wholesale market since the spring of 1998. New York State plans to gradually introduce full competition by 
2001. 
2 The total value of generating assets nationwide, assuming an average value of $4501KW, is $314 billion. 
There are currently 697,100 MWs of installed capacity in the United States (EIA 1997). 
3 While a generator can potentially operate in many electricity-related markets (real power, reactive power, 
spinning reserve, capacity), the primary market, especially for baseload plants such as the Homer City 
units, is the real power market. Real power, in cents/KWh, is the unit in which a typical homeowner is 
charged. though the costs for other aspects of electricity are bundled into the real power marginal rate. 
4 There are potentially interesting issues when considering stochastic price paths used in real option models 
as endogenously determined in ml equilibrium context While Lund (1993) argues that GBM can not be an 
equilibrium price path for exhaustible resources, Laughton (1998) notes that there are problems with meml 
reversion as ,Ul equilibrium price path. Because of a lack of storability, Laughton's arguments seem to be 
less relevmlt for electricity. 
5 On-peak prices are the high load 16 hours per day, generally 6mn to IOpm, five d.1YS per week. 
6 For a discussion of why nodal prices are appropriate, see Schweppe et al. (1988). 
7 In a still regulated market, meml wholesale on-peak prices increased by 11.6% over the combined 1995, 
1996, and 1998 average (data from Power Markets Weekly). In a volatile competitive market it is likely 
that this change would have been much gre..lter. For exmnple, Mount (1999) suggests that fairly small 
chmlges in capacity can produce large price chmlges in competitive markets. 
8 The size of the relevant production period can be arbitrarily small as the model can be shown to be 
homogeneous of degree zero in M. However, the effect of different estimation periods on the price process, 
mld their effect on asset value, has yet to be explored. 
9 Note that similar versions of this equation, generated by related price paths (e.g. dropping the P 
coefficient of the meml reversion or jump components) do not seem to have convergent series solutions. 
lO For ml introduction 'Uld overview to the solution using infinite series solutions, see Boyce and Diprima 
(1992). 
-
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